The Prince: Chapter 19 Summary & Analysis

Having discussed the most important virtues and vices, Machiavelli turns to the other qualities, which he groups under a generalization: "The prince should .... determine to avoid anything which will make him hated and despised." A prince will earn hatred if he steals "the property and the women of his subjects," and therefore he "must refrain from these." A prince will be despised "if he has a reputation for being fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, [and] irresolute." A ruler must avoid these behaviors "like the plague." A prince must demonstrate "grandeur, courage, sobriety, [and] strength" and act in such a way that "no one ever dreams of trying to deceive or trick him."

A prince who earns this reputation will gain respect, and "against a man who is highly esteemed conspiracy is difficult, and open attack is difficult." A prince must have two fears: "internal subversion from his subjects; and external aggression by foreign powers." A ruler can defend himself against foreign foes by being "well armed and having good allies." Machiavelli writes that good allies follow from good arms. A prince can overcome internal threats by managing relations with foreign powers and guarding against conspiracy. Machiavelli argues, "One of the most powerful safeguards a prince can have against conspiracies is to avoid being hated by the populace." A conspirator will never carry out his deed if he believes that he will "outrage the people." A potential conspirator always fears the "prospect of punishment," and if he also fears the hostility of the prince's loyal subjects, then he will never attempt his crime.

Machiavelli references a modern example of this principle, recounting the conspiracy of the Canneschi against Annibale Bentivogli, the prince of Bologna. The Canneschi family of Bologna killed Annibale, whose only heir was the infant Giovanni. Immediately, the people "rose up and killed all the Canneschi" due to "the goodwill that existed for the House of Bentivoglio at that period." A regent ruled in Giovanni's stead until he was "old enough to assume the government himself." Therefore, a prince can protect himself with the goodwill of the people, but if the people are hostile, then "he must go in fear of everything and everyone." A wise prince takes "great pains not to make the nobles despair, and to satisfy the people and keep them content." This is one of the most important tasks that a prince faces.

Machiavelli cites France as a kingdom that is "well organized and governed." The French king's security rests on the "countless valuable institutions" of the state, especially its parliament. As an "independent arbiter" that functions somewhat separately from the king, the parliament balances the power of the nobles and the people, keeping both groups in check and allowing the king to refrain from favoring one faction over the other. From this "sensible institution," Machiavelli deduces a general rule: "Princes should delegate to others the enactment of unpopular measures and keep in their own hands the means of winning favors." A prince must "value the nobles," but not to the extent that he makes himself "hated by the people," who are the perennial opponents of the nobles.

To support his conclusions, Machiavelli turns to the examples of several Roman emperors. Machiavelli begins by noting a particular challenge that Roman rulers faced: "Whereas other princes have to contend only with the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people," the Romans also had to manage the greed of the soldiers. Many emperors found it difficult to appease both the people and the soldiers, since the people sought peace while the soldiers "loved a warlike ruler." Therefore, those rulers who could not control both the people and the soldiers inevitably "came to grief." Machiavelli adds, "Princes cannot help arousing hatred in some quarters, so first they must strive not to be hated by . . . every class of subject; and when this proves impossible, they should strive assiduously to escape the hatred of the most powerful classes."

Machiavelli writes that the Roman emperors Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, and Alexander, "who all lived unadventurously, who loved justice, hated cruelty, [and] were kind and courteous," met "unhappy" ends, with the exception of Marcus. Marcus maintained high esteem "because he succeeded to the empire by hereditary right, and did not have to thank either the soldiers or the populace for it." However, Pertinax came to grief because he became emperor against the soldiers' will and then attempted to enforce rules of decency on them. Machiavelli writes, "And here it should be noted that one can be hated just as much for good deeds as for evil ones." Machiavelli explains that a ruler must adopt "the same disposition" as "the class of men" on which his "continued ruled depends" to satisfy them and secure his position. The Roman army killed the emperor Alexander, renowned for his "goodness," because it considered him "effeminate."

In contrast, Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, who were all "extremely cruel" and greedy rulers, met "unhappy ends," with the exception of Severus. Despite his oppression of the people, Severus "reigned successfully" because he maintained the friendship of the soldiers. Severus' prowess "so impressed" the people that they remained "astonished and stupefied" while the soldiers "stayed respectful and content."

Machiavelli elevates Severus, who as a new prince ably acted "the part of both a fox and a lion," as an "outstanding" example for new rulers. Under the pretext of avenging Pertinax's death, Severus marched his army on Rome, which prompted the Senate, "out of fear," to declare him emperor. To overcome the remaining divisions between the western and Asiatic parts of the empire, Severus tricked Albinus, who hoped to rule the western half of the empire, into aiding his campaign against Pescennius Niger, commander of the Asiatic army. After defeating Niger, Severus turned on Albinus, eventually conquering his state and killing him. Machiavelli praises Severus' conduct as a "ferocious lion and a very cunning fox," applauding his ability to maintain fear and respect without becoming hated by the troops. Machiavelli argues that Severus' "tremendous prestige always protected him from the hatred which his plundering had inspired in the people."

Severus' son, Antoninus Caracalla, was also a "military man" who won the devotion of the soldiers. However, Antoninus' "ferocity and cruelty were so great and unparalleled . . . that he became universally hated." As a result, one of Antoninus' own soldiers assassinated him. As a side note, Machiavelli adds, "Princes cannot escape death if the attempt is made by a fanatic, because anyone who has no fear of death himself can succeed in inflicting it." However, Machiavelli notes, "Such assassinations are very rare." Returning to Antoninus, Machiavelli asserts that a prince should not gravely injure "anyone in his service whom he has close to him in affairs of state," which constituted Antoninus' mistake.

Turning to Commodus, Machiavelli explains that, as the son of Marcus Aurelius, Commodus succeeded to the throne by hereditary right and thus should have found ruling the empire "an easy task." Commodus needed only "to follow in the footsteps of his father" to control the soldiers and the people. However, with his "cruel, bestial disposition," Commodus earned the hatred of the people by stealing from his subjects, Similarly, Commodus "forgot his dignity" when he "descended into the amphitheaters to fight with gladiators," which made the soldiers despise him. Hated by both the people and the soldiers, a conspiracy resulted in Commodus' death.

Lastly, Machiavelli discusses the rule of Maximinus, a "very warlike man" who, with the favor of the soldiers, succeeded to the empire after the effeminate Alexander's death. Maximinus' reign was short, owing to the fact that he was hated and despised for two reasons: Maximinus was of low birth, which "lowered him in everyone's eyes," and also gained a reputation for extreme savagery. Therefore, the people and the soldiers conspired against Maximinus and killed him.

Machiavelli concludes his discussion of Roman emperors by stating, "Contemporary princes are less troubled by this problem of having to take extraordinary measures to satisfy the soldiers," because modern rulers do not possess the massive standing armies that Rome maintained. Machiavelli declares, "In our own times it is necessary for all rulers, except the Turk and the Sultan, to conciliate [i.e., appease] the people rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful." Machiavelli leaves out the Turk and the Sultan because they both maintain large standing armies.

Summarizing his analysis of the Roman emperors, Machiavelli attributes the downfall of emperors to "either hatred or scorn." Machiavelli concludes, "A new prince in a new principality cannot imitate the actions of Marcus Aurelius, nor is he bound to follow those of Severus." Instead, Machiavelli recommends that a prince carefully combine varying models of conduct, selecting from Severus "the qualities necessary to establish his state, and from Marcus Aurelius those which are conducive to its maintenance and glory after it has been stabilized and made secure."