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Intro
Beyond Good and Evil is a critique of moral philosophy, in which Nietzsche argues that biased conceptions of morality have prevented philosophy not only from reaching the truth, but from being honest with itself about human nature.
Nietzsche begins with the proposition that all philosophers to date have been dogmatic, and that their philosophy primarily reflects their own personal experiences. He blames Plato in particular for this, arguing that Plato’s invention of “the good” created a seemingly objective way to deny individual perspective, and that this Platonic idea has been carried forward through Christianity and the Enlightenment.
Questioning the meaning of “good” leads Nietzsche to question “evil,” and indeed the very validity of such an opposition. To Nietzsche, truth and untruth are both conditions of human life and necessary for human reason. Philosophy accordingly has done more to reveal the prejudices of philosophers than the truth; in this regard it is an expression of what Nietzsche considers to be the main drive of life, the will to power.
Reckoning with the difficulty of separating our conscious and unconscious thoughts and desires, Nietzsche wonders how one can be a “free spirit” and, hopefully, an honest philosopher. To him this requires rejecting—or overcoming—morality as it is, which he argues is not absolute but historically contingent. Nietzsche sees a new kind of philosopher being born and considers his task to be laying the foundations for that philosopher to rise.
In probing the question of morality, Nietzsche comes to religion. Nietzsche finds in religion the social construction of morals which are then presented as absolute. The morality of Christianity specifically is accordingly closely related to its origins in slave revolts against the Roman Empire, and against the Empire’s morals. Nietzsche thinks that religion has an important place in society, but that it should be nothing more than a tool, and that the capture of society’s morals by Christianity lies at the root of modernity’s misguided quest: the abolishment of suffering. This quest has created a dangerous new figure, the herd man.
In a chapter of epigrams, Nietzsche observes various facets of human nature. He comments on the function of memory, the unconscious in particular, the complicated relationship between knowledge and morality, the differences between men and women, the meaning of true maturity, and the cruelty of honesty, among other topics.
Nietzsche then turns to morality directly, arguing that earlier attempts to analyze morals have all been biased by philosophers’ desire to justify their own morality. Identifying the origin of various moralities, Nietzsche argues that morals should function as productive constraints on human behavior, encouraging us to develop one way or another. Platonic-Christian morality, however, has warped this relationship, instead setting our morals against our instincts and creating the herd man. The philosophers of the future, in contrast, must place their hope in the will.
Next Nietzsche tackles the problem of scholarship which, to him, is really a problem of philosophy: contemporary science is so subordinated to the morals of the herd man that it refuses to submit to genuine philosophy, that which “creates values.” Of course, Nietzsche is skeptical of whether such a philosophy currently exists, but nevertheless worries that it cannot influence modern society, with the philosopher instead forced to live like a hermit. Nietzsche also predicts a geopolitical crisis as a result of the collapse of will and the herd man’s ascendancy in Europe, arguing that such politics can only lead to war.
Conceding that the philosophers of the future will still need virtues of some kind, Nietzsche considers what those virtues might be. To Nietzsche, such virtues will require a developed spirituality which believes in a firm “order of rank” in society, rejecting pity. These virtues will also be opposed to the “historical sense” of modern Europe, that of nationalism, which Nietzsche finds to be an artificial response to a lack of whole, organic culture rather than its expression. Nietzsche then returns to the subject of women, angrily dismissing women’s emancipation and advocating the treatment of women as property.
Nietzsche examines the German spirit, both in its true manifestations and those of cheap, artificial “fatherlandishness.” He argues that the Enlightenment and its ideals have paradoxically both created the new, universal European and led to the growth of nationalism and “fatherlandishness,” and that both are manifestations of the herd man. Nietzsche charts these developments through the history of music, argues against anti-Semitism in Germany, sharply criticizes the English character, and praises the French.
Returning to the question of an “order of rank,” Nietzsche affirms his belief in a natural aristocracy emerging from conquest. The conquering caste, or nobles, are then able to pursue disinterested, spiritual, and philosophical inquiries above and separate from the rest of society. Their morality is what Nietzsche calls the master morality; the majority, however, naturally develop a slave morality, of which Christianity, democracy, and the herd man are all examples. Nietzsche believes that as there is an inertial pull to herd moralities, great efforts must be made to counter them and advance humankind.
Nietzsche concludes with a poem, which is both an ode to friendship and a solitary cry, expressing feelings of abandonment together with assurance that his task is necessary, righteous, and “noble.”
