Reflections on the Revolution in France: Section 15 Summary & Analysis

The second “cementing material” is the superiority of Paris. Burke believes this issue is closely tied to the monetary issue and the way France is being divided up. The power of Paris is central to the success of the new government. This compact city enjoys disproportionate strength compared to any of the “square republics” newly formed as subdivisions of France. With Paris at the enter of power, “people should no longer be Gascons, Picards, Bretons, [or] Normans,” but Frenchmen.

Burke argues that the call to be mere “Frenchmen” will not work: “no man ever was attached by a sense of pride, partiality, or real affection […] to a description of square measurement.” This is because affection begins in families. From there, it grows to include neighborhoods and provinces. It’s nourished by habit, not by “a sudden jerk of authority.”

Burke next discusses the National Assembly, which he says is constituted with “every possible power, and no possible external control.” Because it has no established procedures, it can’t be held to any specific system. This means that the current Assembly’s successors will have nothing to go on, and are more likely to act boldly than with “perfect quietude.”

In their “hurry to do every thing at once,” the legislators have neglected to form a senate, or a similar body, to which foreign governments might address themselves, and which might give “a bias and steadiness.” Most monarchies have them, occupying a middle space between the people and the executive power; but France has no such thing.

France’s executive power consists of “a degraded king.” He is really just “a channel” to convey information to the National Assembly. He is not viewed as “the fountain of justice.” He is now entrusted with only the most “odious” duties of justice, basically “one degree above the executioner” and able neither to respect himself nor command respect. Similarly, he has no real executive powers; his name and authority are merely used to execute others’ decrees.

Burke argues that nobody can truly a respect a king whom they have mistreated and imprisoned; if they expect otherwise, “you ought to make a revolution in nature, and provide a new constitution for the human mind.” Moreover, the king’s current situation is so degraded that it has unfitted him for office: “at best, his conduct will be passive and defensive.”

The dauphin (the heir to the throne) will be educated so as “to conform to his situation,” but Burke argues that this will be no education at all. As soon as he learns of his royal ancestry, he will be moved by “Nature” to avenge his parents. The executive ministers are not in a much better position, as they have no real discretion or choice, but must carry out what committees of the National Assembly tell them to do.

The judicature is little better. For one thing, instead of reforming the parliaments, the French Revolution abolished them. Their strength had been their independence and the stability this afforded during times of upheaval. Thus the parliaments had served as a “corrective to the excesses and vices of the monarchy.” Such a body is not less necessary under a democracy, but more so. In their place have been appointed “elective, temporary, local” judges, who are bound to be factional. Worse, they have no settled jurisprudence, but are to be supplied with rules from the National Assembly from time to time.

Next, Burke addresses the state of the army, the third “cementing principle” for the French nation. There has been a breakdown of discipline in the army, unsurprising given that they have been encouraged in the name of the king to join in public feasts and entertainments, rather than undergoing military training. The “mixing [of] mutinous soldiers with seditious citizens” cannot have a good outcome. The relationship between army and crown is likewise problematic, since the army cannot be expected to “yield obedience to a prisoner.” It will probably not be long, either, until the army begins to demand the “right” to elect their officers. And overall, the problem is that, with internal bonds of the nation weakened by revolution, much may depend on the army’s ability to keep order.

Burke observes that there has been no respect paid to property rights since the French Revolution. When people refuse to pay their rents, as has lately happened in Lyons, they are threatened with troops, But this will not be a long-term solution to unrest—they cannot continue undermining principles of subordination in the army, yet expect to “hold in obedience an anarchic people by an anarchic army.”