On Liberty: Chapter 2 Summary & Analysis

Mill writes that the time for defending freedom of the press is past, nor is there any need to persuade people of its necessity. So many writers have written about it from this perspective that there is no longer a need to dwell on it. Most constitutional governments wouldn’t dare put limits on freedom of the press. Society has no right to silence anyone—either through public opinion or legislation—just because their personal opinion differs from the rest. Mill argues that silencing any opinion is evil because it robs all of humanity of the opportunity to either improve by conforming to it or improve by using a false opinion to better determine the truth. Mill proposes to explore both ideas separately.

First, the opinion in question might be true even though those trying to suppress it believe it’s wrong. Still, nobody has the right to deprive others of hearing the opinion and determining its worth for themselves. The assumption that a divergent opinion is false is the same as assuming one’s own infallibility, and this argument can be used to condemn it. Unfortunately, people rarely consider their own fallibility in practical matters, nor do they try to protect themselves from it. People generally benefit from hearing their opinions contradicted, although they run the risk of putting too much confidence in the infallibility of the opinions which the people in their social circle hold. This belief in other people’s infallibility isn’t shaken by acknowledging that other worlds (times, cultures, churches, and so on) hold other beliefs, and fate determines which world a person is born into.

Every age has held false opinions that later ages go on to condemn, but Mill rejects the idea that people should simply stop holding opinions or enforcing those they have reason to believe are true on these grounds. In fact, if society, after careful deliberation, decides an opinion is true, there is a moral obligation to act on it and oppose opinions that are considered false or dangerous to society. Mill reiterates that just because the actions of past ages—including opinions, taxes, and even wars—have been condemned doesn’t mean modern societies shouldn’t act upon their beliefs. Additionally, there must be freedom to contradict any opinion as discussion provides the opportunity to explore whether the opinion is true or not.

Mill believes that people are generally rational and capable of fixing their mistakes. They do this by gaining experience through trial and error, and through discussing opinions and ideas with other people. These discussions must be allowed to take place in order to create positive change in society. Mill argues that only people who are open to criticism of their opinions—something which they ultimately profit by—deserve to be confident in their truth and wisdom. In fact, Mill thinks it wouldn’t be a bad thing to require supposedly wise men to be questioned by the public. Mill argues that even the Catholic Church (which he considers the most intolerant of criticism) considers arguments against canonization before granting someone sainthood.

Mill argues that even the beliefs people hold most dear must remain open to criticism from others because there may always be a “better truth” out there. Although most people will admit that this is a valid point, they still object to debating the topics that they are certain are right. Mill writes that certainty can only be attained through discussion, no matter how uncomfortable. There are also opinions which people believe must be protected for the good of society and for this reason should be protected from criticism because they are useful to society. However, even this—whether an opinion is useful—is an opinion and still requires a fair discussion both for and against its truth. Mill believes that the truth of an opinion is a major part of its usefulness, which is why criticism of an accepted opinion’s usefulness is quickly condemned.

Mill continues to address the human impulse to deny others the opportunity to hear an opinion on the grounds that we personally think it’s wrong. He illustrates the problem with this by exploring the argument against freedom of thought when it comes to a belief in God. Mill acknowledges that others might accuse him of saying faith in God is assuming infallibility. Mill retorts that he doesn’t consider “feeling sure of a doctrine” the same thing as assuming infallibility, but making that decision for other people and refusing to let them hear arguments over its truth, morality, or piety is detrimental to society. Prohibiting debates over an opinion’s morality or piety is dangerous to society because of how often they have punished people for immoral opinions or conduct. Such is what happened to the great philosopher Socrates, who was put to death for alleged impiety.

Mill also uses the Crucifixion of Christ (accused of blasphemy) as an example of how governments punish people for their alleged immoral or impious opinions, and how Marcus Aurelius—by all means a just man—persecuted Christians because he feared Christianity would do more harm than good to the world. Many people will say that those who opposed Christianity were right to do so because truth must be able to pass through that kind of persecution. Mill finds fault with this because it implies that those who introduce any new truths should be punished for it. He asserts that people who hold this opinion must believe that there are no more new truths to be discovered.

Mill argues that the belief that truth always triumphs over criticism and persecution is false because history is full of instances when truth has been put down and either never resurfaces or is set back hundreds of years. In fact, persecution usually does succeed unless those who believe in a truth are stronger than those who persecute them for it. This is clearly seen in how Christianity continued spreading in the Roman Empire despite persecution. Mill rejects the idea that truth has some mysterious power over error and argues that people are often as enthusiastic about errors as they are about truths. The actual advantage truth has over error is that it frequently reappears in the world until it is finally accepted.

Mill acknowledges the argument that, in the modern day, people are no longer put to death for divergent religious opinions, but he also argues that this doesn’t mean society is totally free from legal penalties for it. As an example, Mill brings up a real case in which a man was denied justice against a thief in court because the man said he had no religious belief due to a law which prohibits anyone from presenting evidence if they don’t believe in God. This practice assumes that the oath to tell the truth means nothing without religious belief. Mill considers this rule absurd because it implies all atheists are liars while requiring them to lie about believing in God to assert their rights in court. Furthermore, the law insults actual believers by implying they only tell the truth out of fear of spiritual punishment rather than natural honesty.

Mill writes that this practice is hardly persecution and that many will simply attribute it to the “infirmity of English minds,” which makes them hold on to bad principles even when they no longer really want to practice them. However, Mill worries that persecution on religious grounds will resurface due to a widespread revival of religion, which typically brings with it a “revival of bigotry.” Where there’s already a tendency towards intolerance, it doesn’t take much for people to start actively persecuting those with divergent beliefs. Mill argues that the social stigma attached to people who disown widely held beliefs prevents England from being “a place of mental freedom.” All those who aren’t financially independent rely on society for work, and so they adopt prevailing beliefs because they must be accepted by society in order to get honest work. The upper classes, however, only risk being gossiped about.

Mill argues that even though we don’t punish people very severely for holding different opinions, society still hurts itself in mistreating these people. Because of the lack of social tolerance, people hide their opinions entirely or else these opinions circulate through narrow circles and never make their way to the mainstream. In this way, society remains in a state gratifying to those who think it’s unpleasant to punish people and who want prevailing beliefs to go on undisturbed. This creates some level of intellectual social peace but prevents potentially great minds from openly and fearlessly sharing new ideas or beliefs. The rest of society, too, narrow their thoughts to what is socially acceptable and never enlarge their mind through “free and daring speculation on the highest subjects.”

Some might think it’s good for those with divergent opinions to keep them to themselves, but Mill reminds the reader that this corrodes the minds of the faithful more than the minds of heretics. Mill explains that the faithful will purposely cramp their own minds and refuse to follow any natural train of thought out of fear that they might have a heretical thought. Still others will strive to hide their heretical thoughts and outwardly conform to social expectations. Mill argues that nobody can be a great thinker without following the natural course of their thoughts, and that truth itself has more to gain from having its errors pointed out than by people adhering to it just because it’s the thing to do.

In a “general atmosphere of mental slavery,” there may be an occasional great intellect that asserts itself, but society itself will never be intellectually active. When discussions of humanity’s most important subjects are considered closed, mental activity declines until a period—such as the Goethian period in Germany or post-Reformation period in England—when people no longer fear divergent opinions. During these periods, immense intellectual steps are taken that benefit all of humanity. However, another of these periods will never arise unless society openly asserts its mental freedom.

Mill moves on to the second part of his argument and assumes that new opinions prove true instead of false. Mill asserts that even the firmest believers in their opinions will recognize the value of discussing them more fully because otherwise opinions become “a dead dogma” instead of a “living truth.” There are some people who believe individuals should blindly accept a truth without question. While this prevents people from questioning truth, it also makes the truth weak to argument. Even if this weren’t the case, Mill argues that truth held this way devolves into superstition. It’s Mill’s opinion that for one to truly understand the truth, they must know enough about it to defend it in discussion. This isn’t something that can be taught like in math where there’s one right answer—when it comes to opinions, finding truth means understanding and finding balance between conflicting beliefs.

Mill explains that in topics like religion or morals, there are numerous perspectives from which to view a question, and those discussing it frequently have to work to dispel any appearances that might indicate the truth of a different opinion over their own. People must understand the opposing arguments to a question in order to combat them. If they can’t do that, then they must refrain from making a judgment or else adopt the most popular opinion. Furthermore, a person must hear these arguments from someone who truly believes them, not just from someone who shares their same belief but still knows the opposing side’s arguments. Even many of the world’s most educated people make the mistake of only hearing arguments from people who don’t believe them rather than those who do, and therefore don’t truly understand or know the truth of their opinions or how to defend them.

Mill writes that someone who opposes free discussion would say that it’s not necessary for everyone to know all the reasons why an opinion is true. They would say that it’s enough for there to be some people capable of explaining it and the rest to trust them. Mill points out that even this indicates the need for people to know all objections to a truth have been answered, but it’d be impossible to do this if nobody is free to bring objections up for debate. The Catholic Church addresses this by separating those who are allowed access to all the arguments and texts against their beliefs, and those who must accept belief as truth. In Protestant countries, however, the belief is that everyone must be able to decide what to believe for themselves and so there must be freedom of speech and press.

Mill also argues that without free discussions about truth, the meaning of the opinion is also lost, degraded to nothing but a few words that cease to convey real, living meaning. This can be seen in the formation of different religions—the early days are characterized by passion and vitality, but if they prevail in being accepted as truth then discussion over it dwindles until people passively accept religion rather than actively experiencing it. Without a need to argue over its truth and fight for it to be accepted by dissentients, believers lose interest in talking about it and no longer question the beliefs of others because they see no need to defend their beliefs. This creates a disconnect between religious principles and inner consciousness, which remains vacant and passive rather than active.

According to Mill, the extent to which doctrines remain in the human mind as little more than dead beliefs can be seen in how most Christians hold their beliefs. Even though all Christians profess to embrace the laws of the New Testament, few are guided by those laws in their personal lives. This is complicated by the fact that most people feel compelled to adhere to social custom, which might be generally in keeping with Christian laws, but not always. Mill asserts that, too often, people give their real allegiance to custom rather than Christian law. While all profess to hold the beliefs passed down in scripture, few believe them enough to routinely act on them. This is because these beliefs hold no real power over ordinary believers, who tend to look to external influences for guidance rather than scripture. 

Mill writes that things were different in the early days of Christianity, the proof of which can be seen in how far and rapidly Christianity spread. In the modern world, Christianity is mostly limited to Europe or European descendants. Even the most adamant believers cling to newer beliefs (like Calvin’s or Knox’s) that they have more in common with rather than the fundamentals. This concept—that once a subject is beyond debate, people generally lose their passion for it—can be applied to other topics. There are truths or bits of knowledge that everyone simply knows, but nobody internalizes until personal experience shines a new light on them. Mill says that this is because some truths can’t be understood until people experience them firsthand. Still, the tendency to stop thinking about something once it’s beyond doubt is the reason for most mistakes. 

To those who question whether unanimous agreement must spell doom for ideas, Mill says that he disagrees. He admits that as society progresses the number of debatable doctrines will slowly decline as people discover the truth. When society reaches this point, it would be beneficial to find teachers who can make compelling arguments against truth for the benefit of learners. Similar systems can be found in Socratic dialogues in which Plato presents opposing and supporting arguments for a topic. However, a student who only learns from books will be ill-prepared for actual debate. It’s far better to learn through discussion, although a student must be on guard against viewing all discussion as an argument rather than a means to learning truth. Instead, Mill believes we should thank and listen to those who are willing to challenge our opinions because they help keep our minds active.

Mill highlights another benefit of allowing diversity of opinion: one side of the question is rarely totally true and the other totally false. In fact, usually the accepted belief only holds part of the truth and the opposing belief holds the rest of it. Popular opinions typically hold an exaggerated portion of the truth while heretical ones contain suppressed truths that supporters claim is the whole truth, and the two sides must be taken together to discover what the truth is. Rather than instinctually revolting against new opinions that say popular opinions are totally false, a good judge of human thought and conduct will recognize that both sides of the question are overlooking the partial truths found in each opinion. In fact, they will recognize the value of energetic opposition to popular opinion because it helps draw attention to the partial truth of their doctrines.

Mill writes that if a state’s politics includes “a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform,” then it is a sign of good health at least until one or the other is capable of balancing both order and progress at once. Until the differing opinions of each can be expressed and protected in equal measure, one side of the scale will always outweigh the other. This is similar to the discovery of truth, which frequently requires combining opposite opinions to find the whole truth. Unfortunately, few people are impartial enough to do this and the struggle between the two sides continues. Whatever opinion is accepted reflects the neglected needs of society at that time. This is why it’s important to listen to dissent from popular opinion because “truth would lose something by […] silence.”

Mill responds to the assertion that this concept can’t apply to Christianity-based morality—which is supposed to be the whole and absolute truth—by questioning what exactly is meant by Christian morality. Mill writes that if it’s the morality of the New Testament, then there’s a problem because that book builds off a preexisting morality. One would have to look for morality in the Old Testament, which Mill asserts is actually “intended for a barbarous people.” Ultimately, Mill asserts that Christian morality should actually be called “theological” morality, as it predates Christianity. Humanity does owe a lot to the gradual formation of modern Christian morality for helping create successful societies, but Mill still believes it’s incomplete and describes it as a reaction against pagan beliefs. Furthermore, it is more negative than positive in that there are far more rules for what people should not do rather than what they should.

Furthermore, Christianity idealizes “passive obedience” and encourages selfishness by claiming the fear of hell and hope of heaven should be a person’s primary motive in their actions. Mill also says it disconnects people from positive interest in their peers unless there are self-interested reasons in helping them. Indeed, any sense of duty to society and government comes from ancient Greek or Roman sources, not Christian ones. Still, Mill says that he doesn’t consider Christian morality wholly incompatible with a comprehensive morality but believes that it was intended to be only part of the whole truth, making it useless to look to Christianity for comprehensive morality. Mill fears that exclusively teaching religious morality instead of including secular morality does society a great wrong by encouraging servility to a higher will, which prevents a person from becoming truly good. Because of this, it’s better for some “other ethics” to coexist alongside Christian ones.

Mill argues that this doesn’t mean people should ignore the parts of the truth that exist within Christianity as they begin to accept the parts of the truth that exist outside of it. Instead, people should fight against the tendency to claim a partial truth as the whole truth, and any unjust behavior on this score should be patiently tolerated. Furthermore, Mill believes Christians should remember that some of the most valuable modern morals came from the teachings of people who knew and rejected Christianity. Even this will not prevent sectarianism because there will always be people who insist their opinions are the whole truth. However, suppressing a partial truth is worse than any conflict between parts of the truth because it creates prejudice, and so both sides of the question must be free to share their opinions and audiences should be free to judge which is best for themselves.

Mill summarizes his argument in favor of freedom of opinion, saying it has four distinct grounds: first, that opinions must not be silenced because they might be true and because silencing them implies infallibility; second, the suppressed opinion might contain a partial truth that, combined with prevailing opinion, could form a whole truth; third, that even if an opinion is accepted as a whole truth it will languish and die if people stop voicing differing opinions on it; finally, without discussion, the meaning of truth will be lost or transformed into a mere profession that few people truly internalize and benefit from. To those who claim there should be limits placed on these discussions to keep them fair, Mill says this is impossible because people tend to take offense to any powerful argument against their opinions and accuse the other of being unreasonable.

Mill does admit that there are conditions in which a person might be censured for their manner of sharing opinions, but it’s hard to determine what those conditions are. It’s also difficult to impose limitations on discussions to keep both sides—not just the side which opposes the prevailing opinions—from becoming unreasonable, as many people argue there should be. The worst thing society can do is stigmatize those who don’t share prevailing opinions, particularly because people with unpopular opinions are already at a disadvantage. Furthermore, the law has no right to restrain discussions on opinions, but opinion itself should condemn those who are malicious in sharing their opinions and praise those who can keep a level head in heated discussions. This is what Mill considers the “morality of public discussion,” and he’s comforted by the belief that most people adhere or at least strive to adhere to it.